Abstract. We describe the computation which resulted in the title of this paper. Furthermore, we g i v e an analysis of the data collected during this computation. From these data, we derive the important o b s e r v ation that in the nal stages, the progress of the double large prime variation of the quadratic sieve integer factoring algorithm can more e ectively be approximated by a quartic function of the time spent, than by t h e more familiar quadratic function. We also present, as an update to 15], some of our experiences with the management o f a large computation distributed over the Internet. Based on this experience, we give some realistic estimates of the current readily available computational power of the Internet. We conclude that commonly-used 512-bit RSA moduli are vulnerable to any organization prepared to spend a few million dollars and to wait a few months.
Introduction
One of the earliest descriptions of the RSA public key cryptosystem appeared in Martin Gardner's column`Mathematical Games' in the August 1977 issue of Scienti c American. There, the inventors of RSA presented the following challenge. where the original plaintext English message had been transformed into a decimal number using the transformation A = 01, B = 0 2 , : : : , Z = 2 6 , with 00 indicating a space between words. It is readily veri ed that application of this transformation to the title of this paper, followed by a n eth powering modulo r, results in the encrypted message. Here we describe how we reversed this process and found the title of this paper, thereby solving the`RSA-challenge' and winning the US$100 prize. The prize has been donated to the Free Software Foundation.
The modulus r has 129 decimal digits and is, according to 6], the product of a 64-digit prime p and a 65-digit prime q such that both p;1 and q;1 are relatively prime to e. The primes p and q were kept secret. It is well known that the encrypted message can be decrypted by computing (encrypted message) d is equivalent t o k n o wing the secret primes p and q (cf. 21] ). 5 It follows that the encrypted message can be decrypted by factoring r.
In the full paper, we will describe in detail how we managed to factor r.
This extended abstract consists of a discussion of some historical remarks on the supposed di culty of factoring r (Section 2), an outline of the method that we used to factor r (Section 3), an overview of the analysis that will appear in the full paper (Section 4), a view behind the scenes of this world-wide computing e ort (Section 5), and some concluding remarks (Section 6).
2 Predicting the di culty of factoring r Back in 1976, Richard Guy wrote`I shall be surprised if anyone regularly factors numbers of size 10 80 without special form during the present century ' 8] . In 1977, Rivest estimated in 20] that factoring a 125-digit number which is the product of two 63-digit prime numbers would require at least 40 quadrillion years using the best factoring algorithm known, assuming that a b (modc) could be computed in 1 nanosecond, for 125-digit numbers a, b, a n d c. 6 Thus, it is not surprising that the inventors of RSA felt con dent that`with such a huge modulus the message will never be recovered ' 23] and o ered a $100 prize to the rst successful decoder of the encrypted message. Interestingly, u n til the message was decoded, none of the parties involved remembered the expiration date of April 1, 1982 This does not imply that in order to decrypt the encrypted message it is necessary to nd p and q but no faster way to decrypt an RSA-encryption has yet been published. 6 A similar estimate can be found in 6].
method for which a run-time analysis had been published. To nd a prime factor p it needs, on average, about 2 p p iterations, where each iteration costs two modular multiplications. For a 63-digit prime factor this amounts to at most 1:3 10 32 modular multiplications. This suggests that Rivest might h a ve u s e d the rho method but miscounted the number of zeros. In that case, the correct estimate should have been 4 quadrillion years, which still sounds su ciently impressive to convince people of the infeasibility of breaking 125-digit RSA keys.
Since 1977 many new factoring algorithms have been invented and the availability and speed of computing resources has changed dramatically. Rivest's imaginary`1 nanosecond per modular multiplication' machine, however, still stretches the imagination. With pipelining and special purpose hardware with gate delays of about 10 picoseconds, it might just be feasible, even for 129-digit numbers. If we were to build such a machine, then we estimate that it has a fair chance to nd the 64-digit factor of r after 5 10 15 modular multiplications using the elliptic curve method (ECM). This would require two months: 240 quadrillion times faster than Rivest's estimate | progress that is due solely to improved factoring methods.
Today, nding 64-digit prime factors using ECM is believed to be infeasible. On a Sparc 10 workstation the 5 10 15 modular multiplications on 129-digit numbers that would probably be needed for ECM would take w ell in excess of 15000 years. ECM uses mostly computations on local data which can be kept in the cache, and hardly any access to main memory. Consequently, the method runs x times faster on a machine whose`mips rating' is x times better. Therefore, a statement of the kind` nding a 64-digit prime factor of a 129-digit number using ECM would probably take more than half a million mips years' might make some sense. Here, we rate a Sparc 10 workstation at 35 mips notice that this would imply a mips rating of about 3 million for Rivest's imaginary machine if it used ordinary 32-bit arithmetic.
For the quadratic sieve factoring algorithm (QS), the method that we u s e d to factor r, run-times expressed in mips years are much harder to justify. Sieving algorithms spend most of their time accessing more or less random locations in memory. On most workstations, processor speed is poorly correlated with memory speed and, therefore, the mips rating of the processor is not a reliable measure of the expected performance of a sieving algorithm. To give some examples: on a Sparc 10 workstation QS would have taken about 120 years to factor r, which leads to an estimate of about 4000 mips years. On a Dec 5000/240, rated at 25 mips, we w ould have s p e n t 2 3 7 y ears, which translates into almost 6000 mips years. On a Sun 3/50, however, rated at 1.5 mips, we would have spent about 1100 years but only 1700 mips years. Averaging over the machines that were used, and keeping in mind that we are indulging in energetic handwaving, we give a very approximate estimate of 4000 to 6000 mips years for the time spent on the factorization of r. If the ratio between memory and processor speed of Rivest's machine is not much worse than on current workstations, it could factor r in less than a day. E v en though expressing run-times in mips years is far from ideal for memory-bound processes, it is common practice in factoring literature. It provides a convenient way to compare and predict run-times of factoring problems, and to check the accuracy of theoretical predictions. Heuristically it can be argued that the expected run-time of QS behaves as L(n) = exp((1 + o(1)) p log n log log n)
for n ! 1, where n is the number to be factored. Often, one simply ignores the o(1), and interprets the resulting L(n) a s t h e n umber of operations needed to factor n. Since This does not imply that there are any signi cant digits in 21: Table 1 ].
The table illustrates, however, the approximate growth rate of L(n), which can be used in an attempt to predict run-times: if factoring n 1 takes time t for some QS-implementation and j log(n 2 =n 1 )j is reasonably small, then factoring n 2 using the same implementation can be expected to take time approximately t L(n 2 )=L(n 1 ), where both o(1)'s are simply omitted.
Using this method it was estimated in 2] that factoring a 120-digit number using QS would take about 950 mips years, based on the observation from 16] that factoring a 116-digit number took about 400 mips years. The actual 120-digit factorization took about 825 mips years, slightly less than the prediction, due to several improvements in the program and intentional suboptimality of the parameter choices for the 116-digit factorization. Similar extrapolation of the 120-digit result to r would lead to about 4200 mips years, which i s o n t h e low side of the 4000 to 6000 mips years that we spent. This may be due to a combination of two factors. In the rst place, the e ect of the unknown behavior of the o(1) in the 9 digit jump from 120 to 129 digits is signi cantly bigger than in the jump from 116 to 120 digits. Apparently, neglecting the o(1) leads to an overly optimistic estimate. Secondly, the e ects of small (and relatively slow) memories should be even worse for r than for the 120-digit factorization from 2].
The reason why these deliberations are considered to be useful is that they might help us to assess the security of widely-used 512-bit RSA moduli. Since L(2 512 )=L (10 129 ) 92 (without the two o(1)'s), we nd that factoring a 512-bit RSA modulus using our current QS-implementation can probably not be done in less than 500 000 mips years. An upper bound is harder to give, but a million mips years is probably the right order of magnitude.
We should stress that this estimate might not be a good indication of the di culty to break a 512-bit RSA modulus. It tells us how hard it would probably be for a fairly well understood, reliable and by n o w rather ancient algorithm. The newer number eld sieve factoring algorithm (NFS) (cf. 13]) is asymptotically superior to QS. Recent experiments have suggested that the crossover point between QS and NFS lies well below 116 digits (cf. 5 7] ), but it remains to be seen how w ell the memory requirements of NFS for 512-bit numbers can be handled. In any case, we suspect that with the factorization of r we h a ve seen the last big QS-factorization. Furthermore, given how h a r d i t w as, 17 years ago, to make a decent prediction about the di culty of factoring r, it is probably better to avoid making any rm prediction about 512-bit numbers.
Factoring r
We used the double large prime multiple polynomial variation of the quadratic sieve factoring method (QS) to factor r. The goal of QS is to nd pairs of integers x, y such t h a t x 2 y 2 mod r. B e c a u s e r divides x 2 ;y 2 = ( x;y)(x+y), we n d that r = gcd(r x ;y) g c d ( r x +y). If the pairs are generated in a random fashion, then there is a probability o f 1 =2 that this factorization is non-trivial (because r has only two distinct prime factors) 3]. In QS, pairs x, y are constructed in two s t e p s , t h e sieving step and the matrix step 12: 4.16 16 18 24] . We g i v e a n outline of these steps as applied to r. In the full paper we w i l l g i v e more details.
The sieving step
First, we select a multiplier, a small positive i n teger m such that mr is a quadratic residue modulo many small primes (cf. 9: 4.5.4]). Next, we compute the factor base P, consisting of ;1 and the primes p B 1 for which mr is a quadratic residue modulo p, for some bound B 1 . In the sieving step we collect a set of relations: i n teger tuples (v q 1 q 2 (e p ) p2P ) s u c h t h a t We used m = 5 as multiplier. Asymptotically, the factor base size in QS applied to n behaves as p L(n), for n ! 1 . A factor base size of 245 810 elements was close to optimal for the 120-digit number RSA-120 factored in 2], with multiplier 7. Therefore a factor base of 245 810 p L(mr)=L(7 RSA-120) 554 933 (omitting both o(1)'s) elements should be reasonable but on the small side (because the o(1) grows with n). After experiments with other values, we settled for #P = 524 339 = 51 + 2 19 (and B 1 = 16 333 609). Our choice is certainly within 20% of optimal, and probably slightly suboptimal. We felt that this was less undesirable than the memory-related problems caused by a n e v en larger choice. 7 We used B 2 = 2 30 .
Based on our experience with many other factorizations, we expected that we w ould need about 110 000 fulls before we had enough cycles to complete the sieving step. Experiments indicated that this would take less than 6000 mips years. More than 8 million relations would have to be collected (since only 1 out of every 75 is full), using a program which would need approximately 10:5 MBytes to run. We opted for the idle-cycle collection method from 15]. This sounds easier than it was, even though we could re-use the software, because our e ort would need an order of magnitude more time, memory, and disk space to run the sieving program and to store the relations. We g i v e more details of the resource management in Section 5. We estimate that we had approximately 600 contributors using more than 1600 machines and producing about 80% of the relations. we could use the QS-implementation from 4] on a 16K MasPar massively parallel computer. The choice is on the high side for this implementation, which performed noticeably worse than expected based on the experience from 2].
To nd dependencies among the rows of the 569 466 524 339 bit-matrix with, on average, 47 bits per row, we intended to use the same approach as in previous large scale factorizations. The largest matrix processed so far, however, had less than half the numberofrows and columns (252 222 245 810 with the same density, cf. 2]), making the present e ort an order of magnitude more di cult. Using structured Gaussian elimination (cf. 10 14 19] ) the matrix was reduced to a dense 188 614 188 160 bit-matrix. This took less than 12 CPU-hours on a Sparc 10 workstation, 97% of which was spent building the 4 436 201 280 byte dense matrix, in 268 separate les of about 16 MBytes each.
To nd a dependency among the rows of the dense matrix, we used the incremental version from 1] of the MasPar dense matrix eliminator from 11]. The dense matrix was processed in 5 blocks. With a core size of 1GByte, 41 595 rows could be processed per block. Each n e w b l o c k w as rst eliminated with the pivots found in the previous blocks, then with the new pivots in the block itself, after which the result was written to disk. Each of the rst four blocks resulted in a le of 980 MBytes. Notice that one wrong bit, either in the dense matrix or in the intermediate les, can render the entire computation worthless. For this reason, the dense matrix intentionally contained 268 spurious dependencies which were supposed to be found at regular intervals during the elimination process to signal possible errors.
The entire process took 45 hours on a 16K MasPa r M P -1 : 7 5 m i n utes to read the dense matrix, 100 minutes to write the rst four blocks, and 42 hours for the eliminations. This is better than we had expected, 8 because, unlike previous eliminations, most pivot rows had to be read from disk before eliminating with them and they could not be stored in registers during the elimination. All 268 spurious dependencies were found at the right moment during the computation, and 205`true' dependencies were found at the end. It took a few minutes to convert the 205 dependencies modulo 2 in the dense matrix to dependencies in the sparse one. Computing the pairs x, y with x 2 y 2 mod r took a few minutes per dependency. The rst three dependencies led to r = 1 r. A t 18:15 UT on April 2 1994 the fourth one led to the factorization r = p q, w i t h p the 64-digit Five of the rst ten dependencies were`unlucky'. It might b e i n teresting to note that p;1 = 2 5 3 2 p for a 62-digit prime p = 1 + 2 7 2 p and a 60-digit primep and that q ; 1 = 2 2 41 q for a 63-digit prime q = 1 + 2 2 53 q and another 60-digit primeq. We suspect that p ; 1 and q ; 1 were consciously chosen to have large prime factors, so that r would withstand a Pollard p ; 1 factoring ; mr q = 1 g be the set of 26 679 473 large primes which can possibly occur in the (double) partial relations. Let p(q) b e t h e probability t h a t q 2 Q occurs in a partial relation. In 16] it is shown that t partial relations can be expected to generate c t 2 cycles, where c = ( P q2Q p(q) 2 )=2. To be able to predict the number of cycles among partials it is therefore useful to get more insight i n t h e b e h a vior of p(q). It has been suggested in 16] that p(q) i s proportional to 1=q , for some positive < 1. In the full paper we will analyse which best ts our data, and discuss how well the theoretically estimated number of cycles among the partials agrees with our ndings. Furthermore, we will present the 1 and 2 corresponding to p 1 (q) a n d p 2 (q), where p 1 (q) i s t h e probability that q 2 Q occurs as smallest large prime in a double partial and p 2 (q) is the probability that it appears as largest large prime in a double partial relation.
Di erent factorizations with similar 's usually have similar cycle-yields, which makes the 's good indicators of the cycle-yield. Because the behavior of the 's can be derived long before the factorization is complete, this might be helpful to predict the cycle-yield in other factorizations. The behavior of the cycle-yield is of particular interest for future NFS factorizations where relations can have more than 2 large primes (cf. 7]). Understanding their cycle-yield is crucial to be able to predict the run-times (cf. 5]).
The estimates that were sent to the contributors (cf. Section 5) were based on extrapolations of the cycle-curve. Initially a quadratic curve g a ve a g o o d t , and was therefore used to extrapolate. We lost our con dence in quadratic extrapolation in late December 1993, when the extrapolation predicted that we would need more than 13 million relations. Fortunately, w e noticed in January that a quadratic no longer gave a close t, and that the cycle-curve w as showing stronger than quadratic growth. Experiments indicated, quite unexpectedly, that a quartic function gave a v ery good approximation. However the residuals, although small, were quite well serially correlated, which probably implies that the cycle-curve d o e s not behave as a quartic. Since the error terms were relatively small, and because the rst few extrapolations turned out to be unusually accurate, we k ept using the quartic anyway. W e predicted in early February that 8:15 million relations would su ce. The quartic extrapolation proved to be very slightly optimistic | it turned out that we actually needed 8:2 million relations. In the full paper we will provide more details and graphs of the actual yields and of the quadratic and quartic extrapolations.
Resource management
To factor r we assembled the largest collaboration yet seen in computational number theory and, possibly, performed the largest single computation ever completed. In several important respects, the resources we h a d a vailable were barely adequate for the task. Consequently, i n g e n uity and diplomacy were required for the successful completion of the project. Full details of the resource management aspects of the computation will be given in the full paper here we give a summary of the salient points.
Based on experience with earlier factorizations, especially those in 15] and 2], we could make reasonably precise estimates of the disk space, amount o f computation and memory usage which w ould be required. Before we started, we estimated that we w ould need about 8 million relations, each o f w h i c h w ould take about 350 bytes to store. We knew that a few mips-millenia would be required. We also estimated that the factor base would need to have about 400 000 to 600 000 elements, implying that the sieving programs would take o ver 8 MBytes of active memory. W e did not know, before we started, how many m a c hines and of what power would be available to us but we did have some encouraging o ers of support. It was clear, however, that an unusually large numb e r o f p e o p l e a n d machines would be involved with the project.
The rst action was to settle the size of the factor base. As explained in 3.1, a gure of about half a million primes was close to optimal. A somewhat larger numberwould have reduced the theoretical amount of computation required, but we w ere already using 10.5 MBytes of active virtual memory. G i v en that most of the machines on the Internet have less than 16 MBytes of physical memory, and many have 8 o r less, even 10.5 MBytes is uncomfortably large and would seriously restrict the number of people capable of helping us.
Before going public, the rst and fourth authors ported the software to as many di erent kinds of workstations and PCs as were available to us. The rst author persuaded MIT to lend us a le server for the duration. This machine was a DEC 5000/240 with 32 MBytes RAM and two (later three) 975 MBytes disks. MIT systems sta also agreed to perform regular backups of the information on disk. For these reasons MIT was chosen as collection site.
Also before the computations started, the second and fourth authors wrote documents explaining what we w ere proposing to do, how w e w ere going to do it, and how to get further information should the reader wish to join in. The second author set up several mailing lists and email aliases for communications to and from our workers and the four coordinators he also took on the role of front-line contact person, dealing with virtually all the 600 contributors and many others who expressed an interest but did not join in for whatever reason.
The postings to potential contributors went out on August 19 1993 to thè number theory net', on August 23 to the`cypherpunks' and the`PGP development group', and on August 24 to the following newsgroups: alt.hackers, alt.security, alt.security.pgp, alt.security.ripem, comp.arch, comp.security.misc, sci.crypt, and sci.math. The initial response to our postings and the number of incoming relations was su ciently encouraging to conclude that the project would be feasible.
Once contributors started o ering their services, we had to port our software to their platforms, if we had not already done so. Although one Unix box i s v ery much l i k e another, there are su cient di erences that we often had to ask our contributors to perform the port for us and to send back t h e modi cations so that we could pass them on to others with the same platform. Our code was run successfully on machines as disparate as 16MHz 80386sx PCs and Cray C90s. An attempted port to a Thinking Machines CM-5 failed, but one US corporation managed to get the sieving code running on a couple of fax machines! The relatively severe memory requirements and the commonness of 8 MBytes machines gave u s a strong incentive to produce memory-frugal variants of the siever. By reducing the sieve b a t c h size and by reading the roots of mr mod the p's from a le, we w ere able to reduce the space required from the default 10.5
MBytes to 6.5 MBytes, albeit at a cost of running over twice as slowly. H o wever, half a computer is better than none and by allowing more people to take part, we shortened the overall time taken for the sieving phase. Even so, 6.5 MBytes does not leave m uch room for an operating system and most of our contributors with 8 MBytes machines were only able to run our code overnight.
Once we w ere up to speed we received on average about 40 thousand relations per day, with peaks of over 50 thousand during the holiday seasons. Daily, all newly received relations that satis ed (3.2) were sorted and merged with older data faulty or duplicate relations were thrown out. This took at most a few hours per day, e v en when the accumulated data had reached a couple of GBytes. About one relation in ten thousand received was unacceptable in some way. O f these, many had su ered in transit through mail gateways but we also received a number of relations intended for another factoring-by-email computation being run at the same time | these relations were sent on to the correct destination, together with a polite note to suggest that their contributors be informed of their error.
About half-way through the computation, it became clear that we w ould run out of disk space if we continued to store the relations in plain text. Accordingly, the fourth author wrote a simple but e cient compressor, and the bulk of the data was kept in a more compact format. Each d a y's data was left as ASCII for convenience (fewer processing programs had to be re-written) and a combined uncompress-sort-merge-compress of the total data set performed every few weeks as the disk began to get uncomfortably full. Unfortunately, we did not notice the disk over owing in early January 1994. About three weeks' data had been corrupted fortunately, the outputs from the daily runs of the email processor were still on disk so we w ere able to recover relatively easily.
To monitor the progress, the fourth author adapted the cycle-counting software from 16] to the relatively small workstation we had at MIT. Towards the end of the project this became a challenging task, with several GBytes of compressed data a graph containing several million nodes, edges and components and a few hundred thousand cycles no disk space to decompress or to write intermediate les and only a 25 mips processor with 32 MBytes of physical memory. Details will be given in the full paper.
We have already described in Section 4 how the quadratic extrapolation began to indicate that we would need many more relations than we had predicted at the start of the project. We became seriously concerned at this point that we w ould have di culty in maintaining the interest of our contributors for several months longer than anticipated. Further, although we had enough disk space (just!) to process 9 million relations, an extra 50% would have c a u s e d u s signi cant problems. Luckily, our discovery of the much more accurate quartic prediction was made before we t o l d our contributors, saving us from worrying them with a false alarm.
The resulting counts were mailed to the contributors each month, along with an estimate of how m uch more would be needed. These reports were also posted to Usenet, as it was found that they were very e ective at attracting new contributors. The estimates were based on extrapolation of the cycle-curve (cf. Section 4).
Some substantial e ort had to be devoted to problem solving. As our program had not previously run on certain platforms, its portability had not been proven. Two examples will su ce. One unfortunate contributor discovered that his disk had lled with over 300 MBytes of error messages overnight after our program had run wild. We discovered rather bizarre behavior of a particular compiler for the Intel 80x86 | unless the value of a certain variable was printed out, the program would crash unpredictably.
Conclusion
Our Internet contributors were exclusively volunteers, donating spare computer time from overnight and weekend running. Although 600 people and 1600 machines constitute the largest ad hoc multiprocessor so far assembled, it is only a t i n y fraction of the size and power of the entire Internet. It is di cult to get even a rough estimate of the potential power available. At the time of writing (October 1994) it is thought that there are between 3 and 4 million machines on the Internet it is currently growing at about 10-20% per month. If we assume, conservatively, that there are 3 million machines, each of which can average 5 mips (i.e., a typical 10 mips workstation with 50% availability) the potential power available is around 1:5 10 7 mips | about ve times the power of Rivest's hypothetical machine. In principle, the Internet could have factored r in three hours! The implementation details are left as an exercise for the reader.
Let us attempt to give a more plausible estimate. We believe t h a t w e c o u l d acquire 100 thousand machines without superhuman or unethical e orts. That is, we w ould not set free an Internet worm or virus to nd resources for us. Many organizations have several thousand machines each on the net. Making use of their facilities would require skilful diplomacy, but should not be impossible. Assuming the 5 mips average powe r , a n d a o n e y ear elapsed time, it is not too unreasonable to embark on a project which would require half a million mips years. We conclude that 512-bit RSA keys are on the brink of vulnerability t o a venerable but robust algorithm. However, we believe that solving the RSAchallenge is probably the last gasp of an elderly workhorse. A credible attack o n a 512-bit key would almost certainly use an NFS implementation.
However, even using NFS to factor a 512-bit numberwould be a non-trivial undertaking. Without falling into the trap of making over-precise estimates of run-times, we c a n s a y that the resources required will be well in excess of what we used to factor a 426-bit key. If the open Internet were to be used, the resource management w ould be tricky. If an organization were to purchase the hardware necessary to give an average power of 500 000 mips, | 5000 processors, each rated at 100 mips | an outlay of several million dollars would be needed. Assuming that NFS can be implemented on those machines and assuming that the matrix step can be performed, 512-bit keys would take a few months to factor. Nonetheless, organizations exist with annual budgets in excess of ten million dollars and which might regard it to be cost-e ective to break 512-bit RSA keys protecting information of particular interest.
